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THE SWISS SUPREME COURT ON THE USE OF SECRETARIES AND CONSULTANTS IN THE 
ARBITRAL PROCESS 
By 
Tracey Timlin* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary arbitration is predicated on certain foundational principles.  One 
such principle is that the contract made between the parties controls the character and 
administration of the arbitral process.1  In other words, freedom of contract reigns 
supreme in international arbitration as it  allows parties an opportunity to choose the law 
and processes through which the arbitration of their dispute will be administered.2  As a 
corollary to this principle, parties have the freedom to designate their arbitrator.3  The 
parties’ selection of an arbitrator is considered to be intuitu personae, which means 
“because of the person” or “in view of the person.”4  This means that the parties have 
chosen that arbitrator because of that person’s particular skills, experience, expertise, or 
record.5  As such, in naming an arbitrator, the parties intend that person to decide their 
dispute according to his or her own judgment without any outside influences. 
Despite these principles, there are some contemporary threats to the notion that 
the arbitrator designated by the parties is the sole entity administering and deciding the 
dispute.  Specifically, there has been a growing practice in international arbitration of 
arbitrators using third parties, typically secretaries, to help administer the arbitral 
process.6  As a result, the proper role and duties of arbitral secretaries has been the 
                                                
* Tracey Timlin is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2017 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189, 1189–1193 (2003) (discussing the primacy of the contract in the 
administration of an arbitration proceeding). 
2 See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 27–28 
(7th ed. 2015) (providing that the parties are the “ultimate sovereigns” in the arbitral process through the 
principle of freedom of contract); Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 1189-1193 (recognizing that freedom of 
contract legitimizes the practice of arbitration by giving it a “voluntary character” and providing that 
freedom of contract “is at the very core of how the law regulates arbitration”). 
3 See generally Joint Report of the International Commercial Disputes Committee and the Committee on 
Arbitration of the New York City Bar Association, Secretaries to International Arbitral Tribunals, 17 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 575, 586 (2006) [hereinafter Joint Report] (stating that the fact that the parties choose their 
arbitrator is a key characteristic of arbitration). 
4 Michael Polkinghorne & Charles B. Rosenberg, The Role of the Tribunal Secretary in International 
Arbitration: A Call for a Uniform Standard, 8 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 107 (2014). 
5 Charles J. Moxley, Jr., Selecting the Ideal Arbitrator, 69 DISP. RESOL. J., 1, 3-4 (2005). 
6 See generally Joint Report, supra note 3, at 586 (stating that it is “common practice” for arbitrators of 
international tribunals to appoint secretaries during the arbitral process); Lawrence W. Newman & David 
Zaslowsky, The Fourth Arbitrator: Contrasting Guidelines on Use of Law Secretaries, N.Y. L.J. Nov. 29, 
2012, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202579604896/The-Fourth-Arbitrator-Contrasting Guide 
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subject of some debate in recent years.7 This debate has led to a spectrum of different 
approaches taken by various arbitration institutions.8  One recent approach is that 
provided in a May 2015 Swiss Supreme Court decision (“Swiss Decision”).9 This 
decision is important in three respects.  First, it provides guidelines for arbitrator use of 
third parties in Switzerland, which was a question of first impression for the Court.10  
Second, the Court approved of a wide range of duties for secretaries, which allows a basis 
of comparison to other approaches.11  Third, in addition to its acceptance of secretaries, 
the Court also permitted arbitrators to use consultants.12  This presents different 
challenges in the debate surrounding third party involvement in arbitral proceedings and 
presents unique issues and questions left unanswered by the court.   
II.   BACKGROUND 
While the possible use of a consultant in an arbitral proceeding is a relatively new 
addition by the Swiss Supreme Court in the context of the debate surrounding third-party 
assistants, there has been a fair amount of discussion and discourse on the potential role 
and duties of secretaries in recent years.13  The debates have highlighted the possible 
                                                                                                                                            
lines-on-Use-of-Law-Secretaries?slreturn=20151023002038 (stating that the practice of using secretaries to 
assist in the administration of arbitration is fairly common and is particularly common in arbitration taking 
place in continental Europe). 
7 See generally Kyriaki Karadelis, The Role of the Tribunal Secretary, GLOB. ARB. REV., Dec. 21, 2011, 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/30051/ (discussing a debate regarding the proper role of 
secretaries in arbitral tribunals at the Global Arbitration Review Live Event in London in 2011); Clemmie 
Spalton, Are Tribunal Secretaries Writing Awards, GLOB. ARB. REV., Nov. 9, 2012, 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/30962/are-tribunal-secretaries-writing-awards (discussing 
the debate at the Global Arbitration Review Live Event in London in 2012 over the proper role of 
secretaries in drafting arbitral awards). 
8 See e.g., International Chamber of Commerce, Note on the Appointment, Duties and Remuneration of 
Administrative Secretaries, 23 INT’L CT. ARB. BULL. 19 (2012) [hereinafter ICC Note]; AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2004) 
[hereinafter AAA Code of Ethics]; HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, 2013 
ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION RULES (2013) [hereinafter HKIAC Rules]; INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, YOUNG ICCA GUIDE ON ARBITRAL SECRETARIES (2014) [hereinafter Young 
ICCA Guide]; HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF A 
SECRETARY TO THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL (2014) [hereinafter HKIAC Guidelines]; Joint Report, supra note 
3. 
9 Bundesgericht [BGer][Federal Supreme Court] May 21, 2015, 4A_709/2014 (Switz.). 
10 Id.; Kyriaki Karadelis, Swiss Court Okays Tribunal Assistants, GLOB. ARB. REV., Aug. 4, 2015, 
http://global arbitrationreview.com/news/article/34037/swiss-court-okays-tribunal-assistants/ (stating that 
this case was the first for the Swiss Supreme Court on the use of arbitral secretaries and consultants). 
11 Bundesgericht [BGer][Federal Supreme Court] May 21, 2015, 4A_709/2014, 51 (Switz.). 
12 Id. 
13 See generally Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 6; Polkinghorne & Rosenberg, supra note 4; Courtney 
J. Restemayer, Secretaries Always Get a Bad Rep: Identifying the Controversy Surrounding Administrative 
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advantages and disadvantages of third party involvement in arbitration proceedings and 
have resulted in attempts by different agencies, administering institutions, and 
commentators to provide frameworks or guidelines on the role of third parties in the 
arbitral process.14 
A.  Advantages of Third Party Involvement in the Arbitral Process 
1.   Advantages of Secretaries 
There are various reasons that an arbitrator may want to use a secretary to help 
conduct the arbitral process.  Some of these benefits center around the efficiencies that a 
secretary might add to the process.  For example, at a debate during a Global Arbitration 
Review event in London in 2011 surrounding the appropriate roles of administrative 
secretaries in arbitral tribunals, some delegates took the position that a secretary can save 
the parties money because they demand a lower hourly rate than the arbitrator.15  Thus, 
arbitrators can delegate some responsibilities to a secretary that he or she would 
otherwise have to perform, allowing the parties to pay a lower cost.16  Along the same 
lines, a secretary can also make the proceeding more time efficient.  One of the reasons 
that parties choose to arbitrate their disputes is that it provides a more efficient and 
streamlined process than a judicial proceeding.17  Thus, where an arbitrator can delegate 
some responsibilities to a third party and save time, this process may in fact be consistent 
with the overall goals of arbitration and the individual parties.   
Additionally, allowing a third party secretary to assist in the arbitral process may 
improve decision-making.  During the same debate in 2011, one London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA) arbitrator posited that the use of a secretary allows the 
arbitrator to focus solely on the merits of the dispute rather than any administrative 
problems or issues.18  In other words, after delegating some tasks to a secretary, the 
arbitrator is in a better position decide a case on its merits.19  Thus, in the sense that 
                                                                                                                                            
Secretaries, Current Guidelines, and Recommendations, 4 Y.B. ON. ARB. & MEDIATION 328 (2012); 
Karadelis, supra note 7; Spalton, supra note 7. 
14 See e.g., ICC Note, supra note 8; AAA Code of Ethics, supra note 8; HKIAC Rules, supra note 8; 
Young ICCA Guide, supra note 8; HKIAC Guidelines; supra note 8; Joint Report, supra note 3; 
Polkinghorne & Rosenberg, supra note 4; Restemayer, supra note 13; Bernhard F. Meyer & Jonatan Baier, 
Arbitrator Consultants – Another Way to Deal with Technical or Commercial Challenges of Arbitrations, 
33 ASA BULL. 37 (2015). 
15 Karadelis, supra note 7. 
16 Polkinghorne & Rosenberg, supra note 4; Karadelis, supra note 7. 
17 CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 14 (highlighting that arbitration is more “flexible” than judicial 
proceedings because a “reduction of litigious obfuscation results in an economy of time and money”). 
18 Karadelis, supra note 7. 
19 Polkinghorne & Rosenberg, supra note 4. 
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parties to an arbitration agreement intend an arbitrator to decide their dispute, a secretary 
may be beneficial in enabling the arbitrator to better focus on that task.      
Another possible benefit to allowing a secretary to participate in the arbitration 
proceeding is that the secretary himself or herself gets valuable experience.  Lawrence W. 
Newman and David Zaslowsky point out that the secretary to an arbitral tribunal is often 
young a lawyer serving as something of an apprentice to the experienced arbitrator.20  
The experience of working as a secretary to an arbitrator can build this young lawyer’s 
skills in arbitral adjudication.21  At a 2012 Global Arbitration Review conference in 
London, one practitioner compared this system of designating a young lawyer as an 
arbitrator’s secretary to the clerk system in the Supreme Court of the United States.22  
Although this comparison was made in direct reference to the debate at that conference 
surrounding whether secretaries should draft awards, it provides a useful example of a 
practice in which adjudicator reliance on third party assistance is generally accepted.23  
While this advantage may seem far removed from any the parties receive in a particular 
dispute, it can benefit the practice of arbitration in the abstract by training young lawyers 
to someday become experienced arbitrators.  
2.   Advantages of Consultants 
The debate over third party involvement in arbitral proceedings has largely 
centered on secretaries.24  However, there is some support for the use of an arbitral 
consultant.25   For one, a consultant may similarly increase the efficiencies of 
arbitration.26  When an arbitrator can rely on a consultant to help answer technical 
questions that the arbitrator otherwise would have to spend a significant amount of time 
researching, the consultant may reduce the length of the proceeding.27  Similarly, 
                                                
20 Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 6. 
21 Id.; Karadelis, supra note 7. 
22 Spalton, supra note 7. 
23 While this comparison may be useful in providing a frame of reference for understanding the nature of an 
arbitral secretary, it may also be overstated.  For one, the nature of the cases before an arbitrator is vastly 
different from those cases which are before the United States Supreme Court, which almost always serves 
as the court of last resort.  In contrast, the arbitrator tends to serve as something more akin to a court of first 
instance, the lower level trial court.  Thus, the analysis may change when considering that a law clerk to a 
Supreme Court Justice is not faced with attending the initial hearings, viewing the evidence, and fact-
finding for a particular dispute.  However, it may also be useful to consider the fact that lower level trial 
court judges also rely on assistants, secretaries, clerks, or interns.  To this end, it may be more useful to 
compare the experiences of those clerks to that of an arbitral secretary, a comparison which is beyond the 
scope of this comment. 
24 Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 6; Polkinghorne & Rosenberg, supra note 4;   Karadelis, supra note 
7; Spalton, supra note 7. 
25 Meyer & Baier, supra note 14; HKIAC Rules, supra note 8. 
26 Meyer & Baier, supra note 14, at 42. 
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depending on the hourly rate of the consultant and the manner in which he or she is paid, 
the time savings could also potentially translate into cost savings for the parties.28  Thus, 
using a consultant may also support the overarching efficiency goal of arbitration.29 
Along the same lines, a consultant could also enable an arbitrator to render better 
decisions.  Whereas with a secretary this argument stems from the idea that the arbitrator 
will be able to focus more on the merits of the dispute,30 the idea here is that a consultant 
can provide specific expertise on the underlying context of the dispute and enable the 
arbitrator to better understand it.31  In this sense, one could argue that a consultant, in 
providing technical expertise,  can provide a higher level of quality to the decision itself.   
B.  Disadvantages of Third Party Involvement in Arbitral Proceedings  
1.   Disadvantages of Secretaries  
Despite the advantages, there may also be significant disadvantages to using a 
third party secretary in an arbitral proceeding.  The use of secretaries in arbitral 
proceedings has been fairly controversial and sparked debate in recent years.32  The 
disadvantages are often considered in relation to the tasks or duties charged to the 
secretary.  For example, while there may be general acceptance in international 
arbitration practice towards a secretary performing purely administrative tasks,33 more 
controversial tasks tend to include conducting research, attending deliberations and 
hearings, and drafting awards.34  When performing these types of tasks, the argument 
goes, a third party secretary becomes more akin to a “fourth arbitrator” than a secretary or 
administrative assistant.35  This can be a problem because, as mentioned previously, 
                                                                                                                                            
27 Id. at 37. 
28 Id. at 42. 
29 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 14. 
30 Karadelis, supra note 7; Polkinghorne & Rosenberg, supra note 4. 
31 Bundesgericht [BGer][Federal Supreme Court] May 21, 2015, 4A_709/2014, 51 (Switz.) (providing that 
a consultant may be used in complex or technical disputes to answer non-legal questions of the arbitrator 
according to his or her own skill and expertise in the field). 
32 Karadelis, supra note 7 (discussing a debate regarding the proper role of secretaries in arbitral tribunals at 
the Global Arbitration Review Live Event in London in 2011); Spalton, supra note 7 (discussing the debate 
at the Global Arbitration Review Live Event in London in 2012 over the proper role of secretaries in 
drafting arbitral awards). 
33 Polkinghorne & Rosenberg, supra note 4 (stating that “it is generally accepted that tribunal secretaries 
may handle administrative tasks, such as coordinating logistics and secretarial services”). 
34 Id. 
35 See Polkinghorne & Rosenberg,  supra note 4; Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 6; Karadelis, supra 
note 7. 
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arbitrators are chosen intuitu personae.36  Thus, if a secretary performs tasks which the 
parties left solely to the authority of the arbitrator, the arbitrator’s use of a secretary may 
violate the party’s contract.   
 When considering the nature of these more controversial tasks, it can become 
more apparent why they have the potential to violate the principle of intuitu personae.  
With respect to conducting research, the means chosen by a secretary may ultimately 
impact the final decision.37  As Michael Polkinghorne and Charles Rosenberg state, 
“[S]ome express concern that any summary or research performed by the tribunal 
secretary necessarily bears the secretary’s perspective and thus might improperly 
influence the arbitrator’s own evaluation.”38  Further, the secretary’s position or 
perspective might become even more apparent if he or she is responsible for drafting part 
or all of the award.  In choosing to arbitrate, parties bargained for an award rendered their 
chosen arbitrator.39  Thus, the very act of someone other than the arbitrator drafting the 
award might be problematic.  One practitioner at the 2011 debate in London suggested 
that even allowing the secretary to draft the “mechanistic” parts of award, such as the 
facts or procedure, is a problem because the arbitrator’s act of thinking through the facts 
and the parties’ arguments is “key” to decision-making.40  This problem of drafting can 
be compounded by the secretary’s attendance at deliberations and hearings.41  If the 
secretary has personally witnessed the arguments and evidence in that case, he or she 
does not have to solely rely on the direction of the arbitrator in how to draft the award.  
Thus, the disadvantages of using a secretary in an arbitration proceeding go to the heart 
of the party’s contract and the fundamental principles of intuitu personae.   
2.   Disadvantages of Consultants 
Consultants pose many of the same dangers to the arbitral process as secretaries.  
Although there is a potential that a consultant may make the process more efficient,42 the 
opposite might be true.  A secretary is seen to increase cost efficiency because he or she 
can perform work that the arbitrator would otherwise have to perform at a lower hourly 
                                                
36 Moxley, supra note 5, at 3-4; David McLean, Selecting a Party-Appointed Arbitrator in the US, Nov. 11, 
2014, https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/appointed-arbitrator-us-mclean; Polkinghorne & Rosenberg, 
supra note 4. 
37 Polkinghorne & Rosenberg, supra note 4. 
38 Id. 
39 See generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 14 (stating that parties choose their arbitrators in 
consideration of that arbitrator’s particular skills and expertise to “avoid inexpert judges who may be prone 
to impose legalistic solutions upon commercial problems”); Moxley, supra note 5, at 3-4; McLean, supra 
note 36. 
40 Karadelis, supra note 7. 
41 Polkinghorne & Rosenberg, supra note 4. 
42 See Meyer & Baier, supra note 14, at 42. 
  274 
rate. 43  However, a consultant is appointed to provide additional advice, expertise, or 
assistance to the arbitrator that the parties may not otherwise have expected or intended.  
Thus, using a consultant, especially one with a high hourly rate, may increase the overall 
cost to the parties. 44 
Additionally, the use of a consultant has the potential to violate those same 
fundamental principles of freedom of contract and intuitu personae as discussed in 
respect to secretaries.  In providing advice or guidance to the arbitrator on a particular 
technical aspect of the dispute, the consultant may be unable to separate his or her own 
personal perspective or bias.  This is similar to the criticism regarding a secretary 
conducting research.45  Further, although a consultant may not be tasked with drafting an 
award, it may be similarly problematic to have them in attendance at hearings and 
deliberations.  Any slant the consultant possesses regarding the facts, underlying context, 
or even merits of the dispute can impact the way he or she sees the case and provides 
information to the arbitrator.  Thus, if the consultant can attend or even participate in 
deliberations, this can have a direct effect on the arbitrator’s decision-making. 
C.  Survey  
There are many different competing standards, guidelines, and model rules on the 
proper role of third party secretaries which have emerged from various arbitration 
administering institutions and groups, and commentators.46  In addition, there are some 
references to the idea of an arbitral consultant.47  A discussion and comparison of these 
various standards is useful in demonstrating the spectrum of perspectives on third party 
involvement in arbitral proceedings. 
                                                
43 Karadelis, supra note 7; Polkinghorne & Rosenberg, supra note 4. 
44 Those cost-efficiency problems with a consultant are dependent on the way a consultant is paid.  If the 
parties are responsible for paying the costs of the consultant, the arbitrator’s reliance on a consultant can be 
said to increase the cost-efficiency for the parties.  However, if the arbitrator or arbitral institution pays for 
the consultant, the use of a consultant may not increase the cost for the parties.  Even so, using a consultant 
does not necessarily increase the cost-efficiency benefits for the parties.  These issues may be further 
complicated by the ideas discussed previously that a consultant could increase the time-efficiency overall, 
which can impact the cost-efficiency of the dispute.  Thus, these are questions that are best considered with 
respect to the particulars of each individual case. 
45 Polkinghorne & Rosenberg, supra note 4. 
46 See e.g., ICC Note, supra note 8; AAA Code of Ethics, supra note 8; HKIAC Rules, supra note 8; 
Young ICCA Guide, supra note 8; HKAIC Guide, supra note 8; Joint Report, supra note 3; Polkinghorne 
& Rosenberg, supra note 4; Restemayer, supra note 13. 
47 HKIAC Rules, supra note 8; Meyer & Baier, supra note 14. 
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1.   Arbitration Administering Institutions 
Many leading arbitration organizations have taken stances on the practice of 
having an arbitral secretary.48  For example, the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC)49 Rules are silent on the issue of secretaries to an arbitral tribunal.50  However, in 
2012, the ICC issued a Note on the Appointment, Duties, and Remuneration of 
Administrative Services (“Note”) to provide guidance on the issue.51  This Note allows 
for the use of secretaries provided they meet the same requirements of independence and 
impartiality as an arbitrator52 and provides a list of tasks that the secretaries may 
perform.53  In addition to some more administrative tasks, this list also includes 
“attending hearings, meetings and deliberations; taking notes or minutes or keeping time” 
and “conducting legal or similar research.”54 However, the Note then provides that the 
arbitrator may not “delegate decision-making functions” or allow the secretary to 
“perform any essential duties of an arbitrator.”55  The Note also provides that an 
arbitrator has a “duty personally to review the file and/or to draft any decision of the 
Arbitral Tribunal.”56   
The American Arbitration Association (AAA)57 takes a slightly different view.  In 
2004, the AAA published The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, 
which also allows for the use of secretaries in arbitral proceedings.58  The AAA states, 
                                                
48 This Part is not meant to provide an exhaustive survey of all arbitration institutions, but rather to provide 
some examples to illustrate the various possible approaches. 
49 The ICC is a “leading provider” in dispute resolution services worldwide and is headquartered in Paris, 
France. See generally ICC: INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC Dispute Resolution Services, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/organization/dispute-resolution-services/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
50 ICC: INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC Rules of Arbitration, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/ (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
51 ICC Note, supra note 8. 
52 Id. at 1. 
53 The list of appropriate tasks includes “transmitting documents and communications on behalf of the 
Arbitral Tribunal; organizing and maintaining the Arbitral Tribunal’s file and locating documents; 
organizing hearings and meetings” among others. Id. at 2. 
54 ICC Note, supra note 8. 
55 ICC Note, supra note 8. 
56 Id. 
57 The AAA is a leader in alternative dispute resolution headquartered in the United States. See generally 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, About the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about?_ 
afrLoop=4175604162708177&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=19iae40ysz_52#%40%3F_afrWindo
wId%3D19iae40ysz_52%26_afrLoop%3D4175604162708177%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-
state%3D19iae40ysz_96 (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
58 AAA Code, supra note 8. 
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“An arbitrator may obtain help from an associate, a research assistant or other persons in 
connection with reaching his or her decision…”59 It is interesting to note that this 
language may be broad enough to include a consultant considering that it is not explicitly 
limited to secretaries.  Regardless, any reliance on a third party assistant is predicated on 
informing the parties.60  In addition, while there is no list of tasks that a secretary is 
eligible to perform, the AAA also expressly provides that an arbitrator may not delegate 
any decision making authority to anyone.61   
The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)62 also does not have 
specific rules governing secretaries to an arbitral tribunal.  However, on the 
organization’s webpage, LCIA provides a brief description of its position on the 
appointment of secretaries to its tribunals.63  The description states that the LCIA allows 
for the appointment of secretaries, but specifically provides that “[t]he duties of the 
administrative secretary should neither conflict with those for which the parties are 
paying the LCIA Secretariat,64 nor constitute any delegation of the Tribunal’s 
authority.”65  It also provides that even for administrative tasks like scheduling, the 
Secretariat maintains final authority.66  It then provides a sampling of the tasks which a 
secretary can perform, which includes “organising papers for the Tribunal, highlighting 
relevant legal authorities, maintaining factual chronologies, keeping the Tribunal’s time 
sheets and so forth.”67 
The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC)68 does mention the use 
of arbitral secretaries specifically in its rules.  Article 13.4 of the HKIAC Administered 
Arbitration Rules states that an arbitral tribunal may appoint a secretary “after consulting 
                                                
59 Id. at 7. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 6. 
62 The LCIA is a “leading institution for commercial dispute resolution” headquartered in London, England. 
See generally LCIA: ARBITRATION AND ADR WORLDWIDE, Introduction, 
http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/introduction.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
63 LCIA: ARBITRATION AND ADR WORLDWIDE, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.lcia.org/Frequently_Asked_Questions.aspx#Secretaries (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [hereinafter 
LCIA FAQ]. 
64 The Secretariat of the LCIA is the entity which handles all the day-to-day administration for disputes.  
See generally LCIA: ARBITRATION AND ADR WORLDWIDE, Organisation, 
http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/organisation.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
65 LCIA FAQ, supra note 63. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 The HKIAC is a leading arbitral institution headquartered in Hong Kong which is prominent in the Asia-
Pacific Region. See generally HKIAC: HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, Why HKIAC?, 
http://www.hkiac.org/arbitration/why-choose-hkiac (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
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with the parties.”69  The rule then states that the secretary must remain independent and 
provide disclosures to ensure that he or she will be impartial during the proceedings.70  
However, the HKIAC also provides rules which govern something similar to the 
“consultant” of the Swiss Supreme Court.  Article 25 deals with “Tribunal-Appointed 
Experts” and provides: “To assist it in the assessment of evidence, the arbitral tribunal, 
after consulting with the parties, may appoint one or more experts.”71  It then further 
provides that the arbitrator may meet with this expert privately and that the expert will 
provide a written report to the tribunal on the issues of the dispute.72  However, this 
written report is also provided to the parties for their consideration and comment, and the 
parties may request a hearing in which they can question the expert on his or her 
findings.73 
2.   Model Rules  
Some major arbitral institutions have published their own guidelines or model 
rules on the issue of secretary involvement in an arbitral forum.  For example, in 2014 an 
entity formed under the umbrella of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration 
(ICCA)74 named Young ICCA75 published a Guide on Arbitral Services (“Guide”) which 
sought to remedy some of the problems surrounding the use of arbitral secretaries.76  This 
Guide was produced by the Young ICCA Task Force on the Appointment and use of 
Arbitral Secretaries in order to “examine the use of arbitral secretaries and advance a 
more transparent and robust approach to the role of secretaries in arbitration.”77  The 
Guide explicitly provides that the secretary’s roles can extend beyond the purely 
administrative to include such things as “researching questions of law,” “attending the 
arbitral tribunal’s deliberations,” and “drafting appropriate parts of the award.”78  
                                                
69 HKIAC Rules, supra note 8, at 21. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 29. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 30. 
74 The ICCA is an international NGO which aims to improve the practice of arbitration worldwide.  See 
generally ICCA: INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, International Council for 
Commercial Arbitration, http://www.arbitration-icca.org/about.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
75 Young ICCA is an organization under the auspices of the ICCA which is aimed at providing a network 
for young professionals in arbitration and dispute resolution. YOUNG ICCA, About Young ICCA, 
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/YoungICCA (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
76 Young ICCA Guide, supra note 8. 
77 Id. at 1. 
78 Id. at 11. 
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However, the Guide also provides that a secretary must be appointed “with the 
knowledge and consent of the parties.”79 
In addition to its own rules governing the appointment of arbitral secretaries, the 
HKIAC also recently promulgated its own Guidelines on the Use of a Secretary to the 
Arbitral Tribunal (“Guidelines”), effective June 1, 2014.80  These Guidelines can apply in 
arbitrations administered by HKIAC under its own rules, arbitrations under the 
UNCITRAL rules, or in other cases after consulting with HKIAC.81  The Guidelines state 
that an arbitral secretary may be appointed by the tribunal once it has notified the parties 
and provided disclosures regarding the particular secretary to the parties to ensure 
impartiality.82  The Guidelines also provide a list of administrative tasks and a list of non-
administrative tasks which the secretary may perform.83  These lists provide that the 
secretary may attend deliberations, conduct research, and draft “non-substantive” parts of 
the awards provided that the tribunal “ensures that the secretary does not perform any 
decision-making function or otherwise influence the arbitral tribunal’s decisions in any 
manner.”84 Both Young ICCA and HKIAC were nominated for a Global Arbitration 
Review (GAR) award for their efforts to define guidelines and model rules in this area.85     
3.   Commentators  
In addition to the rules, guidelines, and proposals provided by the various arbitral 
institutions outlined above,86 various commentators have also suggested standards to 
address the problems surrounding third party involvement in the arbitral process.87  These 
approaches vary depending on what the commentator believes to be the most important 
element of the debate.  For example, some prize uniformity,88 while others favor 
efficiency and expertise.89  This section will consider two examples90 of proposals for 
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introducing third parties into the arbitral process more effectively or fairly: one focused 
on secretaries and one focused on consultants. 
For secretaries, Michael Polkinghorne and Charles Rosenberg attempt to 
introduce a uniform standard for the role of secretaries in the arbitral process.91  The goal 
in introducing a uniform standard was to help ease some of the debate on the issue which 
could allow instances of “abuse.”92  To Polkinghorne and Rosenberg, the lack of 
uniformity on the proper role of secretaries “might negatively affect the perceived 
legitimacy of the arbitral process and the resulting award.”93  To that end, they suggested 
eight standards which could serve as uniform guideposts across different jurisdictions and 
arbitral institutions.94  These standards address the possible impartiality of the secretary 
and the remuneration of a secretary as well as considering the various duties a secretary 
could perform.95  For these duties, the standards address “(i) organisational and 
administrative tasks; (ii) research; (iii) attendance at deliberations; (iv) draft[ing] 
procedural orders and non-substantive portions of awards; (v) draft[ing] substantive 
portions of awards; and (vi) decision-making.”96  Through these various standards, the 
ultimate goal of this proposal is to achieve uniformity in the way to address and regulate 
secretarial involvement in arbitration.97  This will allow parties and arbitral institutions to 
have greater certainty over the role of secretaries so that arbitration can be conducted in 
accordance with the reasonable expectations of everyone involved.98 
Bernhard F. Meyer and Jonatan Baier have different emphases in their proposal 
for using consultants in the arbitral process: efficiency and expertise.99  Meyer and Baier 
point out that arbitration often involves complex and technical cases, which requires the 
parties to either have specialist arbitrators or to spend time and resources trying to 
educate an arbitral tribunal on the complex aspects of a dispute.100  To that end, they 
suggest the use of an “Arbitrator Consultant” who will work to assist the arbitral tribunal 
to “‘translate’ [the] factual and legal decisions into the technical or commercial language 
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of the contract, or vice versa.”101  In this way, an “Arbitrator Consultant” can save time 
and money and ensure a level of quality and expertise to the award.102   
These examples illustrate three important things.  First, they demonstrate the fact 
that there are various proposals to fix and change the way third parties are used in the 
arbitral process.  Second, they demonstrate that the stance one takes depends on what one 
considers to be the paramount concern or issue surrounding third party involvement.  
Third, the example of Meyer and Baier is important in illustrating that proposals such as 
these can have impact on judicial opinion, as their article was cited in the recent Swiss 
Decision upholding the use of both arbitral secretaries and consultants.103 
III.   DECISION 4A_709/2014 OF THE SWISS SUPREME COURT  
Despite the various attempts to address and solve the problems surrounding 
arbitrator use of third parties in the arbitral process discussed above, there is still a lack of 
uniformity on the issue and new problems continue to emerge.  One of the most recent 
judicial opinions on this topic is a Swiss Supreme Court decision dated to May 21, 2015 
(“Swiss Decision”) in which the court upheld not only an arbitrator’s use of an 
administrative secretary, but also the use of a consultant.104  The use of administrative 
secretaries or consultants was an issue of first impression for the Swiss Supreme Court,105 
and the decision may now serve as precedent for the use of secretaries and consultants in 
that jurisdiction.  This case demonstrates some of the problems that have been 
consistently debated over the proper role of secretaries in an arbitral proceeding and what 
tasks they may perform in order to be consistent with principles of freedom of contract 
and intuitu personae.  In addition, this case also raises somewhat more novel questions 
surrounding arbitral consultants. 
A.  Background  
On November 20, 2012, a Luxembourg company (“Party A”)106 contracted with a 
Swiss company (“Party B”)107  for the latter to act as the general contractor on the 
renovation of a building in Biel, Switzerland.108  The contract contained an arbitration 
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clause which provided that the disputes arising between the parties would be settled in 
arbitration by a single arbitrator (“Arbitrator”)109 named in the agreement.110 A year prior 
to the formation of this contract, Party A had entered into a contract with a company to 
serve as an architect.111  The Arbitrator, in addition to being named in the contract 
between Party A and Party B, served as the Chairman of that company.112   
A dispute arose between the parties regarding their respective duties under the 
contract.113  On April 9, 2014, Party A submitted a request for arbitration to the 
Arbitrator.114  In considering the Arbitrator’s prior contractual relationship with Party A, 
Party B moved on May 6, 2014 that the Arbitrator recuse himself from the arbitral 
process.115  On June 2, 2014, the Arbitrator refused Party B’s request for recusal, and on 
September 23, 2014 an interlocutory court upheld the arbitrator’s decision on the grounds 
that Party B knew at the time of contract formation that the Arbitrator had a relationship 
with Party A.116   
After this initial challenge to his authority, the Arbitrator conducted the arbitral 
proceeding with the assistance of a secretary (“Secretary”)117 and a legal consultant 
(“Consultant”)118 whom he unilaterally appointed.119  The Arbitrator rendered a final 
award on November 14, 2014 which ordered Party B to pay Party A a sum of 
2,459,324.08 francs ($2,466,961.26) with an interest of 5% per year and the costs of 
arbitration, set at 70,000 francs ($70,217.38).120   
 
B.  Basis of the Appeal   
On December 17, 2014 Party B filed an appeal in the Swiss courts arguing several 
violations of the Private International Law Act (PILA).121  Chapter 12 of PILA contains 
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the Swiss law on international arbitration.122  Article 190 of the PILA deals with the 
finality of an arbitral award and the potential grounds for a successful appeal.123  It 
provides in relevant part:  
 
2. The award may only be annulled:  
a) if the sole arbitrator was not properly appointed or if the tribunal was 
not properly constituted;  
b) if the arbitral tribunal wrongly accepted or declined jurisdiction;  
c) if the arbitral tribunal’s decision went beyond the claims submitted to it, 
or failed to decide one of the items of the claim;  
d) if the principle of equal treatment of the parties or the right of the 
parties to be heard was violated;  
e) if the award is incompatible with public policy.124 
 
In seeking review of the arbitrator’s decision, Party B alleged violations of all subsections 
of Article 190, section 2 except for subsection b.125  However, the only claim relevant for 
this discussion is Party B’s allegation under Article 190, section 2(a) that the arbitral 
tribunal was improperly constituted.   
 The crux of B’s argument was that the arbitration agreement made between Party 
A and Party B named a single specified arbitrator.126  Thus, Party B argued that the 
arbitral tribunal was improperly constituted, and the award therefore subject to annulment 
under Article 190, section 2(a) of the PILA, because the tribunal consisted of parties who 
were acting as arbitrators despite not having been named as such in the agreement.127 In 
other words, Party B argued that the Arbitrator’s appointment of Secretary and 
Consultant violated the parties’ agreement because Secretary and Consultant provided 
more than just administrative support to the Arbitrator.128     
 In contrast, Party A argued that the contributions made by Secretary and 
Consultant were solely administrative in nature and that the two were the equivalent of 
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legal secretaries.129  In addition, Party A argued that the Arbitrator had notified the parties 
in a letter dated May 21, 2014 of his intention to use Secretary and Consultant for 
administrative support during the arbitral process.130  Therefore, Party A argued, Party B 
should have objected to Secretary and Consultant’s participation at that time, and not for 
the first time on appeal from a final and binding arbitral award.131 
C.  Rationale 
The First Civil Law Division of the Federal Supreme Court (“Court”)132 began its 
decision by recognizing the fundamental principle of intuitu personae with respect to the 
selection of an arbitrator.133  The Court acknowledged that this principle provides that the 
duties and obligations of the named arbitrator cannot be delegated to a third party.134  
With this in mind, the Court highlighted that the named arbitrator must maintain sole 
control over the outcome of the dispute and cannot delegate any decision-making 
authority to a third party.135  However, despite this limitation, the Court did not preclude 
all contribution in the arbitral process by a third party.136  In fact, the court suggested that 
even though the PILA does not mention the use of a secretary during the arbitral process, 
such a use is generally accepted in practice and fully supportable.137   
In reaching this conclusion, the court outlined some of the regular tasks of a legal 
secretary.  These include preparing for hearings, organizing documents, maintaining the 
record, and other tasks that might typically be thought of as purely administrative.138  
However, the court also provided that a legal secretary is not precluded from drafting an 
arbitral award, so long as this drafting is done according to parameters set forth by the 
arbitrator.139  As a corollary to this proposition, the court also provided that a legal 
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secretary should attend the hearings and deliberations of the arbitral tribunal.140  
Following this arguably broad grant of authority to arbitral secretaries, the Court 
provided as the sole limitation that the arbitrator may not delegate to the secretary any 
and all judicial functions, that is, the actual decision-making authority of the arbitrator.141  
Decision-making is the core function of an arbitrator, and as such, it may not be 
delegated.142 
Following its decision to accept the use of a legal secretary in arbitral 
proceedings, the Court then took an even further step in allowing third parties into 
arbitration.  The court held that in certain arbitral proceedings, which are complex or 
technical in nature, an arbitrator may make use of consultants.143  These consultants can 
help answer questions the arbitrator may have on the technical aspects of the dispute, but 
the scope of their authority is limited to non-legal questions posed by the arbitrator to 
ensure that there is no delegation of decision-making authority.144  The court did 
acknowledge that there were risks with this approach.145  However, the Court still held 
that consultants could be appointed sua sponte by the arbitrator without consent of the 
parties.146 
D.  Application of the Court’s Rationale to the Case Before It 
The Court upheld the Arbitrator’s use of the Secretary and Consultant.147  In its 
decision, the Court considered the fact that the Arbitrator had sent a letter to the parties 
on May 21, 2014 which indicated his intention to use not only a legal secretary, but also a 
consultant who specializes in arbitration procedure.148  Further, the Court considered the 
reason provided by the Arbitrator for using the Consultant, which the Arbitrator provided 
in the final arbitral award of November 14, 2014.149  In this award, the Arbitrator 
suggested that Party B’s attempt to recuse the Arbitrator evinced Party B’s hostile 
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attitude toward the Arbitrator’s authority.150  As a result, the Arbitrator relied on 
Consultant as an arbitration expert solely to ensure his own compliance with proper 
arbitration procedure.151  Further, the Court accepted the Arbitrator’s statement that 
despite the presence and assistance of the Secretary and Consultant, he rendered the 
award according to his own knowledge and understanding of the merits of the dispute.152  
Thus, the Arbitrator had not delegated any decision-making authority to Secretary or 
Consultant in the eyes of the Court and there was no evidence that either Secretary or 
Consultant acted as something more akin to a co-arbitrator.153 
IV.   POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE SWISS DECISION 
Many of the issues decided on by the Court in the Swiss Decision have been 
central elements of the debates and controversies surrounding the use of secretaries in 
arbitral proceedings.154  Thus, the Swiss Decision sets precedential guidelines on the 
appropriate role of both secretaries, and now consultants, taking place in that jurisdiction.  
Within the spectrum of different positions taken on the proper role and regulation of third 
parties in arbitral proceedings discussed above, this decision should be characterized as 
somewhat liberal.155  This characterization is largely due to the Court’s broad grant of 
authority to both secretaries and consultants without requiring party consent.  While this 
approach may have discrete advantages,156 it also demonstrates some fundamental 
problems and concerns that may negatively impact party autonomy, freedom of contract, 
and the principle of intuitu personae. 
A.  Problems with Respect to the Arbitrator’s Use of a Secretary  
The Swiss Supreme Court held that in addition to performing those tasks which 
are deemed to be more administrative or secretarial in nature, an arbitrator’s secretary 
may also attend hearings and deliberations and draft arbitral awards so long as the 
arbitrator does not delegate any decision-making functions.157  There are four potential 
issues with this holding.  The first three deal with the proper duties or roles of secretaries 
in whether or not they should perform administrative tasks, draft arbitral awards, or 
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attend hearings and deliberations.  The last issue is whether or not the court’s sole 
limitation of non-delegation of decision-making authority is sufficient to protect the 
rights of the parties.  
1.   A Secretary’s Role in Performing Administrative Tasks  
An arbitrator’s reliance on a secretary to perform purely administrative tasks may 
be the most innocuous version of third party assistance.  In fact, there is some evidence to 
suggest that this role of a secretary is generally accepted within the practice of 
international arbitration.158  A 2012 survey used by Young ICCA in its efforts to produce 
its Guidelines on the subject indicated that 95% of those surveyed approved of the use of 
arbitral secretaries.159  Further, when asked what types of tasks an arbitral secretary 
should perform, there were high approval rating for those tasks which are likely to be 
considered more administrative in nature, such as the organization of meetings and the 
handling of party correspondence.160 
This general approval of a secretary performing administrative tasks might also be 
supported by some of the rules of the arbitral institutions previously discussed.161  For 
example, in its Note, the ICC provided that a secretary “may perform organizational and 
administrative tasks” for the purpose of assisting in the administration of the arbitral 
process.162  The Note subsequently provides examples of what may be considered such 
tasks, and includes things like “organizing and maintaining the Arbitral Tribunal’s file 
and locating documents” and “organizing hearings and meetings.”163  Similarly, 
HKIAC’s recent Guidelines on the subject provide that a secretary “may perform 
organizational and administrative tasks.”164   
Thus, the Court’s decision that an arbitral secretary may perform administrative 
tasks is less controversial  than its decision to allow secretaries to perform more 
substantive duties.  As indicated above, the Court’s positon on administrative tasks is 
relatively consistent with general international standards and practice.  In addition, the 
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idea of a secretary to an arbitral tribunal performing administrative tasks does not suggest 
the same violations of freedom of contract and intuitu personae as might other duties.  An 
arbitrator may be selected because of his or her own personal skills and expertise in the 
subject matter of the dispute,165 but is unlikely to be chosen for his or her skills in 
performing traditional secretarial or administrative tasks.  Further, when a secretary 
performs administrative tasks, it becomes less likely that he or she is performing any 
decision-making functions as prohibited by the Court.166  Thus, for administrative duties, 
it might simply be the case that the advantages of secretaries largely outweigh the 
disadvantages.167 
2.   A Secretary’s Role in Drafting Arbitral Awards  
One of the most controversial topics in the debate surrounding the use of arbitral 
secretaries is whether secretaries may draft any or all of the arbitral award.168  In the 
survey used by Young ICCA discussed above, participants had much lower approval 
rates as the proposed duties “moved away from the purely administrative and towards 
tasks involving analysis and decision-making.”169  For example, only 68.8% of the 
participants approved of a secretary performing legal research for a tribunal and only 
45.2% approved of the practice of a secretary drafting part of an award.170   
At a Global Arbitration Review Live event in London in 2012, practitioners 
discussing the issue of a secretary drafting an arbitral award suggested that the practice 
distances the arbitrator from the dispute which allows a secretary’s perspective on the 
case to impact the award.171  In other words, when arbitrators delegate the task of drafting 
all or part of the arbitral award to secretaries, they may be unable, despite their best 
efforts, to remove their own biases relating to the merits of the dispute.  Thus, this 
viewpoint is inherently present in a secretary’s draft, or even research, and has the 
potential to sway or undermine the arbitrator’s own perspective.172   
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This can be problematic, as mentioned, because of the intuitu personae nature of 
arbitrator selection, wherein these duties of a secretary “may undermine the parties’ right 
to select their arbitrators.”173  As suggested by the Young ICCA survey, the closer the 
tasks done by the secretary get to “tasks involving analysis and decision-making,”174 the 
more it seems that the arbitrator may have delegated his or her fundamental authority.  
Where the arbitrator has delegated his or her decision-making authority, he or she has 
potentially violated the party’s freedom of contract which was exercised in choosing that 
arbitrator to decide the dispute in the spirit of intuitu personae.  Thus, in its decision to 
allow secretaries to draft arbitral awards, the Court may have paved the way for 
arbitrators to flout party autonomy and freedom of contract.     
3.   A Secretary’s Role in Attending Hearings or Deliberations 
The Swiss Supreme Court provided as a corollary to its holding on drafting that 
secretaries could also attend any and all relevant hearings and proceedings.175  For the 
secretary faced with the task of drafting an arbitral award, this position may make a great 
deal of sense because he or she needs to know about the dispute in order to be able to 
effectively write a draft.  Nevertheless, it could also be very problematic.  As mentioned 
with respect to drafting, a secretary’s own biases and perspectives may inevitably insert 
themselves within the draft in a way which is a potential violation of the notion of intuitu 
personae.176  To protect against these possible violations, the Swiss Supreme Court stated 
that a secretary may only draft opinions in accordance with the instruction of the 
arbitrator to ensure that the arbitrator has not delegated any decision-making authority.177  
However, the perspectives and opinions of secretaries can still present themselves in a 
draft prepared under this limitation simply because they wrote it.  One practitioner 
expressed this idea in stating that even allowing a secretary to draft the “mechanist” parts 
of the award like the facts or the procedure is problematic because the act of drafting is 
key to decision-making.178   
This problem is further compounded when the secretary is allowed to attend 
hearings and deliberations.  In a situation in which the secretary has personally heard all 
of the evidence, witnesses, arguments, and participated, albeit perhaps only passively, in 
the deliberations, it is not difficult to imagine that one’s own viewpoint may become 
intermingled with that of the arbitrator.  Where this happens, the work done by the 
secretary has the potential to influence the decision-making of the arbitrator.179  Because 
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the decision-making functions of an arbitrator are non-delegable,180 the potential that the 
secretary plays a role in deciding a dispute in this capacity goes against party intent. 
One solution to this problem might be that if a secretary is allowed to attend 
hearings and deliberations, he or she is thereafter precluded from drafting.  If this were 
the case, the secretary tasked with drafting would only be able to draw from the 
information provided him or her by the arbitrator, and the risk of the secretary weighing 
the evidence of himself or herself may be diminished.  As an example of this approach, 
the ICC’s Note includes within its list of administrative tasks available to a secretary 
“attending hearings, meetings, and deliberations.”181  The Note then provides, “Under no 
circumstances may the Arbitral Tribunal delegate decision-making functions to an 
Administrative Secretary,” and includes later on that the arbitrator retains an inherent 
duty “personally to review the file and/or draft any decision of the Arbitral Tribunal.”182  
Thus, the Swiss Decision is problematic in allowing a secretary to both draft arbitral 
awards and attend hearings and deliberations. This creates a possibility for the secretary’s 
own perspectives to influence the outcome of the dispute and violate party intention in 
naming a particular arbitrator to decide the dispute. 
4.   The Court’s Limitation for Secretaries: Non-Delegation of Core 
Decision Making Functions 
The Court provided one limitation after its arguably broad grant of authority to 
arbitral secretaries: an arbitrator may not delegate any decision making authority to the 
secretary.183  Although this limitation is fairly vague and perhaps ineffective, it may in 
fact be consistent with other guidelines and perspectives.  For example, in its Note, the 
ICC states that the arbitrator may not “delegate any decision making functions to an 
Administrative Secretary.”184  The AAA provides in its 2004 Code of Ethics for 
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes that an arbitrator may seek the assistance of a third 
party, but that an arbitrator may not delegate the duty to make decisions to any other 
person.185  The LCIA provides that the duties of the secretary should not “constitute any 
delegation of the Tribunal’s authority.”186  While these example are certainly not 
exhaustive, they do illustrate the trend that arbitral secretaries can be useful,187 but the 
arbitrator must stop short of delegating to them any decision-making authority.   
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However, what is not clear from the Swiss Decision is how to ensure that there is 
in fact no delegation of decision making authority to the secretary.188  As previously 
discussed, this line can easily be blurred the more a secretary steps away from 
administrative roles into things like drafting awards and attending hearings and 
deliberations.189  For some, conducting research or drafting an award may be inherently 
part of the decision-making process.190  Short of an arbitrator explicitly saying that he or 
she is delegating his decision-making authority, it is not clear in what situation this 
limitation could be enforced.  For the Swiss Supreme Court at least, the standard seems to 
involve a great amount of trust in and deference to the arbitrator.191 This is demonstrated 
by the fact that in the Swiss Decision, the Court trusted the Arbitrator’s statement that he 
had not delegated any of his decision-making authority.192   
B.  Problems with Respect to the Arbitrator’s Use of a Consultant  
In addition to the fairly commonly discussed issues surrounding arbitral 
secretaries the Swiss case provides something of a novel issue to this debate, that is, the 
proper role of consultants in an arbitral proceeding.  As previously discussed, the debates 
and discussions on these issues focus heavily on an arbitrator’s use of secretaries, and a 
consultant is inherently very different.  As such, the Court’s almost perfunctory 
allowance of a consultant in the arbitral process without examining any possible 
differences between a consultant and secretary or the risks involved193 could present new 
problems.  These include how to determine when a consultant can be introduced per the 
Court’s standard, the differences between a secretary and a consultant, and whether 
safeguards in place, similar to those discussed with respect to secretaries, will ensure 
there is no delegation of any decision-making authority.  
1.   Standard for Introducing Consultants into the Arbitral Process 
The Court provided that an arbitrator may seek the assistance of a consultant, 
without the consent of the parties, when a dispute is complex or technical in nature.194  
However, the court did not provide a clear standard for when a dispute has met a level of 
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complexity or difficulty high enough such that an arbitrator may then seek out a 
consultant.  This standard is somewhat vague and open-ended and may allow for 
consultants in a large number of disputes.  In addition, given that the arbitrator has the 
power to appoint a consultant sua sponte, he or she has the sole discretion to decide that 
the standard for a consultant has been met.195  Thus, this is another standard for which the 
court is likely to be highly trusting of and deferential towards the arbitrator196 because a 
reviewing court is unlikely to second-guess the arbitrator’s judgment that the case has 
met the requisite complexity or technicality.   
2.   The Nature of a Consultant  
One of the reasons that parties may decide to utilize arbitration rather than the 
courts is that they are able to choose their arbitrator.197  A judge, by the nature of his or 
her profession, has to handle a wide range of disputes and may not be particularly skilled 
or well-versed in some specialized fields.198  In contrast, parties will often name an 
arbitrator  with experience and expertise in the industry relevant to the dispute.199  In 
other words, there tends to be a presumption when naming an arbitrator that a person with 
experience and expertise in a particular industry will be the best person to render a 
decision on a dispute within that industry.200  In keeping with this, parties, in the spirit of 
intuitu personae, choose the arbitrator they think most qualified to handle their dispute, a 
practice which can often result in choosing one arbitral institution or tribunal over 
another.201  This is the principle of freedom of contract at work, and it highlights why 
arbitrators are so integral to the arbitral process.   
The Swiss Decision challenges these fundamental notions of freedom of contract 
and arbitrator selection.  In holding that consultants are acceptable in disputes which are 
highly complex and technical enough that the arbitrator needs advice and assistance in 
handling the complexities, the Court was ignoring the fact that parties typically will 
choose an arbitrator precisely because of their special industry expertise or skill.202  If the 
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parties thought that a particular arbitrator would not have been able to understand their 
dispute, the parties were free at the time of contract formation and arbitrator selection to 
choose an arbitrator that would have had the expertise to do so.  That the parties named 
who they did suggests that the parties intended that person to handle their dispute 
according to his or her own knowledge and skill.203  Thus, allowing an arbitrator to name 
his or her own consultant without the consent of the parties, as made acceptable by the 
Swiss Decision, may flout party intent and violate the principles of freedom of contract 
and intuitu personae.   
3.   The Court’s Limitation for Consultants: Non-Delegation of Core 
Decision Making Functions 
The Swiss Supreme Court placed the same limitation on the use of consultants as 
it did secretaries: that there be no delegation of the decision-making functions of an 
arbitrator.  However, as with secretaries,204 it is not clear how the Court can be sure that 
no delegation is occurring when the very practice of using consultants itself may lead to 
subtle, or even obvious, influences on the arbitrator’s decision-making authority.  As 
discussed with reference to secretaries, the very fact that a secretary is conducting 
research, drafting an award, or attending hearings or deliberations may allow the 
secretaries’ opinion to sway that of an arbitrator.205  This may be even more true with 
respect to consultants who are intended by their very position to give advice and guidance 
to the arbitrator, as compared to the role of a secretary.  The Court attempted to rectify 
this problem by providing that the consultant to the arbitrator could only answer 
questions about the technicalities and complexities of the dispute, rather than anything to 
do with the merits of the case.206  However, there is no real policing of the relationship 
between the consultant and the arbitrator, and, as mentioned previously, the Court 
suggested that the standard for evaluating whether any decision-making authority has 
been delegated should be very deferential to the arbitrator.207 
These potential abuses are readily seen in the Swiss Decision itself.  The 
consultant relied on in that case was not an expert in construction or any aspect of the 
construction industry.  Rather, he was an expert in arbitration procedure.208  Thus, in the 
same breath that the court is saying an arbitrator may not rely on a consultant for 
anything other than advice on the complex and technical nature underlying a dispute, it is 
also endorsed the use of a consultant to help an arbitrator answer the legal questions 
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surrounding the administration of arbitration itself.209  Further, the Court did not even 
provide that this particular dispute was so complicated, complex, or technical as to 
warrant the introduction of the consultant to answer these arbitration procedure questions 
in the first place.210  Rather, the Court simply accepted the Arbitrator’s statement that he 
felt the consultant was necessary because of the hostility evinced by Party B.211  Thus, the 
Court did not establish that the Arbitrator met its own standard, and in fact suggested that 
an arbitrator may appoint a consultant for other reasons unrelated to the complex and 
technical standard.  This leaves the standard for introducing and using consultants unclear 
and open-ended.   
V.   PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE SWISS DECISION ON SWISS ARBITRATION 
Switzerland does a great deal of international arbitration.  Statistics indicate that 
“Switzerland was the second-most popular seat for arbitrations under [the ICC Rules] 
with 94 arbitrations commenced in 2013.”212  Additionally, in 2014 the Swiss Chambers’ 
Arbitration Institution administered 105 cases under the Swiss Rules of International 
Arbitration.213  Statistics also indicate that 77% of the parties involved in the latter set of 
cases have a foreign domicile.214  Given that Switzerland is a popular seat for 
international arbitration, this recent decision may not have a large impact on the decision 
to conduct arbitration within the jurisdiction.   
One useful thing about the Swiss Decision is that it was an issue of first 
impression for the Swiss Supreme Court.215  Thus, where there was a lack of guidance on 
the proper use of third parties in arbitration prior to this case, there now emerges a 
precedential standard.  In addition, at least some parts of the Swiss Decision are 
consistent with other international standards.216  These include the general approval of a 
secretary performing administrative tasks217 and the limiting principle that an arbitrator 
may not delegate his or her decision-making authority.218  Therefore, the decision is not 
likely to have a chilling effect on international arbitration in consideration of these issues.  
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However, in response to the liberal grant of authority to secretaries and 
consultants, there may be some small changes in international arbitration in Switzerland.  
Given that Switzerland is a popular seat of international arbitration,219 it is unlikely that 
parties will completely forgo the jurisdiction.  However, it might be wise for parties to 
consider contracting around some of the proposals of the Swiss Court to provide greater 
limitations on the roles of secretaries and consultants.  To that end, the way parties 
approach contract formation may be the most significant change following the Swiss 
Decision. 
VI.   AN ATTEMPT TO SOLVE SOME OF THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE SWISS DECISION 
With these practical considerations in mind, parties should carefully consider the 
effects that the Swiss Decision may have on their disputes.  The case presents both 
consistently debated and somewhat novel issues surrounding the introduction of third 
parties into the arbitral process to advise and assist arbitrators.  In considering these 
problems, this Part will attempt to provide alternative solutions for parties to consider that 
better reflect the fundamental principles of freedom of contract and the intuitu personae 
nature of arbitrators.  Thus, these proposed solutions are predominantly focused on party 
behavior at the time of contract formation.  As discussed, there are several other sets of 
model rules proposed by both commentators and arbitral institutions.220  These models 
are helpful in identifying some of the problems and potential solutions to the issues of 
secretaries to the arbitral tribunal.  However, the rules proposed below are in direct 
reference to those issues raised in the Swiss Decision, especially with respect to the fairly 
novel question of an arbitrator using a consultant in an arbitral proceeding.   
A.  Proposed Rules for Secretaries  
Given the fundamental principles of freedom of contract and the intuitu personae 
nature of an arbitrator, the hallmark of any and all proposed rules with respect to the use 
of arbitral secretaries is the consent of the parties.  The parties are typically free to choose 
to go to arbitration, to choose the rules that will govern arbitration, and to choose the 
arbitrator that will administer arbitration and ultimately render an award.221  Thus, the 
parties should also be free to choose whether or not the arbitrator may rely on an arbitral 
secretary.  Given that there are discrete benefits to the use of an arbitral secretary, namely 
that they can provide better cost and time efficiency,222 parties should be able to decide 
for themselves if these advantages outweigh any potential disadvantages. 
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In keeping with the notions of party consent, the parties should be able to consent 
to the duties and tasks of the secretaries to the arbitral tribunal.  In other words, it should 
be within the discretion of the parties as to whether a secretary may only help to organize 
proceedings and maintain records, or if that secretary may also attend hearings, take 
minutes, conduct research, or even draft arbitral awards.  Thus, parties remain free to 
weigh the pros and cons of secretary involvement and make decisions of their own 
volition.  In this way, the parties can ensure that the arbitrator does not delegate any 
duties to the secretary that the parties did not provide for in their agreement to arbitrate.  
Party consent, then, serves as the missing safeguard or policing mechanism to the Swiss 
Supreme Court’s notion that arbitrators cannot delegate their decision-making authority.  
Where freedom of contract and party consent reigns supreme, these issues dissipate.   
B.  Proposed Rules for Consultants  
Party consent may be even more important for consultants.  As previously noted, 
parties select arbitrators with that particular person’s experience, expertise, or skill in 
mind with the assumption that the person will best be able to render a decision in the 
context of that party’s particular industry.223  If a party is able to so carefully choose an 
arbitrator based on his or her skill, a party should also be able to choose the consultant 
that an arbitrator may rely on in the event that assistance is necessary.  This way, the 
parties maintain the same level of control over the skill and expertise of those involved in 
handling the dispute.  Thus, some form of party consent over the person chosen as the 
consultant would be more effective in protecting the interests of the parties.  One might 
consider as an example the HKIAC rule regarding Tribunal-Appointed Experts.224  While 
these rules also do not require party consent at the outset of appointing an expert, and 
state that an arbitrator may meet with the expert privately, they also provide that the 
parties are given a copy of the expert’s report and have an opportunity to not only 
question the findings of the expert but to question the expert himself.225  Requiring party 
consent at the outset would provide even more protection for the parties.  However, this 
example from the HKIAC does illustrate that the Swiss Supreme Court may not have 
provided clear or sufficient safeguards against unilateral imposition of a consultant by an 
arbitrator and the dangers this may pose.226   
It may also be necessary to clarify when a consultant may enter the proceedings.  
Under the Swiss Decision, an arbitrator may seek out the advice of a consultant when the 
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dispute is complex or technical.227  However, this kind of loose or vague standard may 
open the door to the use of consultants in many arbitral proceedings.  Thus, the parties 
should be able to decide if and when an arbitrator may rely on the assistance of a 
consultant.  If the parties are unable to agree, the default rule should be that no consultant 
can be used.  At the very least, the parties agreed to arbitrate and agreed that the arbitrator 
or arbitral tribunal would administer the dispute.  Thus, when the parties cannot agree if a 
consultant can or should be used, the arbitration should proceed under those terms to 
which the parties have agreed.   
Lastly, if the parties do agree that the arbitrator may rely on a consultant under 
certain circumstances, the parties should also be free to designate the scope of that 
consultant’s authority.  This is especially important in light of the Swiss Decision, where 
the Court limited the authority of consultants to technical, non-legal questions about the 
dispute,228 but then approved of the use of a consultant whose expertise was solely in 
administration procedure.229  Therefore, parties should be able to contractually limit the 
type of consultant which can be used during the proceeding and the type of questions he 
or she may be asked.  As an example, in the case at issue, the parties could have specified 
that the arbitrator could designate a consultant whose expertise was in some specialized 
aspect of the construction industry.   
VII.   CONCLUSION 
The Swiss Supreme Court’s opinion highlights some of the problems surrounding 
the introduction of third parties to assist an arbitrator.  An arbitrator has been entrusted by 
the parties to decide the dispute according to his or her own knowledge and judgment of 
the issues.  Thus, in situations where an arbitrator has relied on the help and advice of 
secretaries and consultants, it is possible that the arbitrator has betrayed the trust placed 
in him or her by the parties and delegated his or her authority in a way that violates the 
parties’ agreement.  For secretaries, this may be especially true in situations where the 
arbitrator allows the secretary to draft arbitral awards and attend hearings and 
deliberations.  The problems may be even clearer with respect to consultants, who by 
their very nature are there to advise the arbitrator, not just assist the arbitrator with 
administrative tasks.   
Given the fundamental principle of freedom of contract wherein the parties are 
free to choose arbitration and who their arbitrator will be, many of the problems 
surrounding the use of third parties in arbitral proceedings can be solved by focusing on 
party consent.  While the focus on party consent may hamper some of the cost-saving and 
time-saving advantages of relying on a third party in arbitral proceedings, the parties 
should have the right to ensure that their dispute is being decided by the person or 
persons whom they have appointed and to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of 
third party assistance for themselves.
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